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AN OBSERVATION ABOUT VARIATIONS OF THE
DIFFIE-HELLMAN ASSUMPTION
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Abstract. We generalize the Strong Boneh-Boyen (SBB) signature scheme
to sign vectors; we call this scheme GSBB. We show that if a particular (but
most natural) average case reduction from SBB to GSBB exists, then the
Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) and the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
have the same worst-case complexity.
1. Introduction. Many researchers have looked at the Boneh-Boyen
signature scheme for Anonymous Credentials applications. In credential systems
the credentials are usually represented as vectors. One can easily sign a vector
using any ordinary digital signature scheme, by first hashing the vector into a
relatively short message and then signing it. However, credential systems are very
intricate, and have many additional requirements. The ability to sign vectors
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without destroying the algebraic structure may help accomplish some of those
difficult requirements (but may also open the doors to new attacks, so one must
be careful). Our complexity-theoretic result may be of interest in such cases.
In complexity theory, we argue about relations between the computational
complexities of two problems using reductions. That problem A is efficiently
reducible to problem B, means that we could use B as a subroutine (oracle) in
an algorithm that solves A efficiently. An algorithm is efficient if it runs in a
time polynomial in the length of its input. A reduction can be worst-case or
average-case. The former implies only that the most difficult instances of A
are at least as hard as the most difficult instances of B for a given probability
distribution. The latter establishes that the average instances of A are at least as
hard as the average instances of B. Such reductions are more interesting and more
difficult to establish. The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption was
introduced in 1976 [4] and is assumed to be hard. It is the basis for the classic
Diffie-Hellman cryptosystems. The Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (SDH) was
introduced in [3], and is the foundation for modern pairing-based cryptosystems
initially introduced in that paper and subsequently used in many others. It is
known that SDH is reducible to CDH, but it is not known whether CDH is
reducible to SDH even in the worst case.
We generalize the Strong Boneh-Boyen (SBB) signature scheme to sign
vectors (GSBB). There is a trivial worst-case polynomial time reduction from
SBB to GSBB. We show that if a particular average case reduction exists then
the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) and the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
have the same worst case complexity.
2. The modified Weil pairings. Let p be a prime and F = Zp the
finite field of order p. Let E be an elliptic curve of order p over F. Let P ∈ E
be a generator of E. The modified Weil-pairing function ê : E×E → F∗ satisfies
the following properties:
1. eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ E and all a, b ∈ F.
2. If P is a generator of E then g = eˆ(P,P ) is a generator of F.
For more details on general bilinear groups see [3, Section 2.2].
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3. The Strong BB system. We start from a special case of [3], which
is as strong as the general SBB, and then generalize it to sign vectors.
Global public parameters: An elliptic curve group E over field F, both
of a large prime order p, and a bilinear pairing function eˆ : E × E → F; P ∈ E
a generator of E.
Secret key: x, y, random integers mod p.
Public key: P ∈ E, U = xP , V = yP , z = eˆ(P,P ) ∈ F, z 6= 1.
Signing: To sign an integer message mmod p, pick a random rmod p.
The signature is (σ, r), where
σ =
1
x+m+ yr
P ∈ E.
Verification:
eˆ(σ,U +mP + rV ) = z.
4. Generalization. A variation of the above signature system may be
useful for signing vectors of credentials (a person has a vector of credentials; each
entry in the vector is a credential). Suppose that the message is a vector m =
(m1,m2, . . . ,mt) ∈ Z
t
p. Let the secret key be x, y, where now x = (x0, x1, . . . xt),
xi, y are integers mod p and the public key is P ∈ E, Ui = xiP , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , t,
V = yP , z = eˆ(P,P ) ∈ F, z 6= 1. The signature is (σ, r), where
σ =
1
x0 +
∑t
i=1(ximi) + yr
P ∈ E.
Verification:
eˆ(σ,U0 +
t∑
i=1
miUi + rV ) = z.
5. Reductions. To simplify the discussion we look at the case t = 2.
The claims hold for t > 2 as well. Let α be the reduction from the SBB system,
with message=m, to the GSBB generalized system where the message is a vector
(1,m1,m2)). Throughout this paper, r ∈R T means that element r is picked at
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random from finite set T with uniform distribution. Here is a concise description
of the systems, which hints at a natural reduction:
SBB GSBB
Secret x, y ∈R Zp x0, x1, x2, y ∈R Zp
Public
P ∈ E, U = xP, V = yP,
z = eˆ(P,P ) 6= 1
P ∈ E, Ui = xiP, i = 0, 1, 2
V = yP, z = eˆ(P,P ) 6= 1
Sign r ∈R Zp, σ =
1
x+m+ yr
P r ∈R Zp, σ =
1
x0 +m1x1 +m2x2 + yr
P
Verify eˆ(σ,U +mP + rV ) = z? eˆ(σ,U0 +m1U1 +m2U2 + rV ) = z?
5.1. The restricted reduction. In the following assignments, variables
of any SBB instance appear on the left and are mapped (→) onto variables of
GSBB.
P → P , U → U0, V → V (these assignments imply z → z, x → x0,
y → y). Pick any x1, x2, m1, m2 subject to the constraint: m = x1m1 + x2m2.
The signature returned by oracle GSBB is the signature needed in the SBB
instance. This restricted reduction is a worst case reduction. It says nothing
about average case complexity [7], [5], [2], [8].
An average case reduction from problem A to problem B should be valid,
efficient, and the domination property should hold. Roughly speaking, Valid
means that the given reduction algorithm with oracle B usually solves A. Effi-
cient means that on the average it runs in polynomial time in the input length.
Domination assures that instances of A map “evenly” into the space of instances
of B (i.e., that they do not all map into a small subset of all instances of B).
In the previous reduction, validity and efficiency hold, but domination
does not hold. We elaborate on the latter. The following definition of Distribu-
tional Decision Problem is taken from [2] (where it is likewise defined for search
problems).
Definition 1. A Distributional Decision Problem is a pair (D,µ) where
D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} and µ : {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1] is a probability distribution function.
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Let (R,µ1) and (S, µ2) denote the distributional decision problems cor-
responding to SBB and GSBB, respectively. Here µi is the distribution function
(and µ′i is the corresponding density function). Let M be a probabilistic or-
acle Turing Machine that reduces (R,µ1) to (S, µ2), The probability Pr[v :=
M(u)] is taken over M ′s internal coin flips (the corresponding notation in [2] is
AskM (u, v)).
Definition 2. [2] Domination holds if there exists a constant, c > 0,
such that for every v ∈ {0, 1}∗,
µ′
2
(v) ≥
1
|v|c
·
∑
u∈{0,1}∗
Pr[v :=M(u)] · µ′
1
(u).
In our restricted reduction, the machine, M, maps short strings to longer
strings, they are longer by roughly a factor t ≥ 2. Let r > 1 be the exact factor
of expansion. Let |u| = n. Then M : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}rn.
Here is an example of a uniform distribution µ:
∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗, µ′(x) = |x|−22−|x|.
We show that (S, µ2) does not dominate (R,µ1) with respect to the re-
stricted reduction (playing the role of M) if both µ1 and µ2 are uniform (as
above).
In the restricted reduction, for every v ∈ S, there is exactly one u ∈ R,
such that Pr[v := M(u)] = 1, and for all other values of u, Pr[v := M(u)] = 0.
This simplifies the domination condition to µ′
2
(v) ≥
1
|v|c
µ′
1
(u), where u is the
particular value for which Pr[v :=M(u)] = 1. For r > 1 it is impossible that
lim
|x|→∞
r−2|x|−22−r|x| ≥
1
rc|x|c
|x|−22−|x|,
since for large enough |x|, the exponentials are the dominant factors. We sum-
marize these observations as follows:
Lemma 1. Let (R,µ1) and (S, µ2) be distributional decision problems,
and let M : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}rn be a reduction from (R,µ1) to (S, µ2)with r > 1,
such that for every v ∈ S there is exactly one u ∈ R, such that Pr[v :=M(u)] = 1,
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and for all other values of u Pr[v :=M(u)] = 0. Then domination does not hold
for this reduction when both µ1 and µ2 are uniform.
We can hope for domination, and hence for average case reduction, if
Pr[v := M(u)] = o(exp(−r|u|)). This happens if we can choose u and v inde-
pendently. This calls for a non-restricted reduction.
5.2. A hypothetical non-restricted reduction. Given an arbitrary
GSBB signature (i.e., without the previous restriction m =
t∑
i=1
ximi) the Ran-
domized Turing Machine, M , that reduces SBB to GSBB has to efficiently com-
pute an SBB signature for a given message m. The machine M is given m, it
tosses its internal coins, and picks pairs (xi,mi), i = 1, 2, . . . , t, with uniform
distribution. It then computes b, s.t. m = b+
t∑
i=1
ximi. Given
σ2 =
1
x0 +
∑t
i=1 ximi + yr
P.
it computes
σ1 =
1
x+m+ yr
P.
The above reduction can be summarized as follows:
Given: P, b,
1
z + b
P,
Find:
1
z
P.
To make it fully general (subject only to the restriction that the two
problems are over the same elliptic curve group, and using the same generator)
we should allow multiple oracle calls, so the input becomes P, bi,
1
z + bi
P , i =
1, 2, . . . f(), where f() is polynomial in the security parameter. The output stays
the same. Then in the reduction we invoke the oracle γ := 1-SDH f() times. The
oracle γ is probabilistic, so each time it produces a new bi.
5.3. Proof of security. To show that GSBB is secure we need to con-
sider the setting of Strong Existential Un-forgeability ([3, Section 2.1]). It allows
multiple challenges to the signer, after which an attacker computes a signature
on a new message. SBB is existentially unforgeable. A random Turing reduc-
tion from SBB to GSBB would prove the same for GSBB, where both problems
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allow multiple challenges. Let the number of challenges of SBB be nSBB, and
the number of challenges to GSBB (in a reduction) be nGSBB = f(nSBB), where
f() is any polynomial. If a reduction M exists for any nSBB , then it exists for
nSBB = 0. We show that if a particular form of the latter exists then there is
a reduction from Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) to Strong Diffie-Hellman
(SDH) that succeeds with the same probability. We proceed to define that special
reduction, for the identity polynomial f(). The case of a general polynomial f()
is only slightly more complex. This is the most general reduction subject to the
restriction that the two problems are over the same elliptic curve group, and
using the same generator.
Let z = x +m + yr mod p, and define b ∈ [0, p) such that z + b = x0 +
t∑
i=1
ximi + yr mod p. The machine that performs the reduction has a subroutine
M with the following basic input/output relations:
Given: P, b,
1
z + b
P,
Find:
1
z
P.
It is very unusual to use a reduction or a subroutine of a reduction (M) as
a problem to which we reduce another problem. Usually we draw directed graphs
that describe reduction relations among problems, where the problems are nodes
and the reductions are directed edges. But a reduction can also be defined as a
problem, to and from which we make other reductions. It is also unusual to have
the OR/AND of problems as nodes1. We are about to do all of the above.
5.4. Strong Diffie-Hellman vs. Computational Diffie-Hellman.
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem was defined in [3] with all the
trappings of average case complexity, and SBB was proven there as hard to forge
as q-SDH. Moreover, [3] proved a high lower bound on its complexity for a generic
(“blackbox”) group. Still, it is not known if an SDH oracle can help solving the
much more mature Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, published in
1976 (a reduction the other way exists).
We show that the existence of an average case reduction from (R,µ1) to
(S, µ2) implies the worst-case equivalence of CDH and SDH.
LetM be a non-restricted reduction, as defined in the previous subsection.
We use 1-SDH as a short-hand for 1-SDH with ǫ = 1 (a special case of q-SDH,
1Joux [6] has done OR before.
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but sufficient for worst case reductions). I = inversion in the elliptic curve group.
In the following short problem description, the group orders are given, but we
omit them from the descriptions. The I/O relations defining these problems are:
Given Find
M P, b,
1
z + b
P
1
z
P
CDH R,uR, vR uvR
1-SDH
with ε = 1
P, zP
(
c,
1
z + c
P
)
Inversion P, zP 1
z
P
Problem M is an average case reduction. Yet we can view it as a function
(a problem defined by input/output) and analyze worst case reductions to it and
from it. In the list below, all the reductions are worst case reductions. We show
that:
1. Oracles M and 1-SDH together solve I (Lemma 2 below, see also [3], last
paragraph of sec. 2.3),
2. Problem 1-SDH is reducible to problem CDH (well-known, see also Lemma
3 below),
3. Problems I and CDH are reducible to each other (see Lemma 4, and [1]),
4. We conclude from the above observations that ifM is efficiently computable
then problems CDH and 1-SDH are worst case reducible to each other in
polynomial time. This problem has been open for a few years now.
Lemma 2. Using oracles M and 1-SDH we can solve I.
P r o o f. Given I’s input call oracle 1-SDH to find
(
c,
1
z + c
P
)
. Then
call oracle M to find
1
z
P. 
For the sake of self-containment here is a reduction from 1 − SDH to
CDH. Notation: Let A = w1R, B = w2R. Define βR(A,B) = w1w2R.
Lemma 3. There exists a worst-case reduction from problem 1-SDH to
problem CDH.
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P r o o f. Given 1-SDH’s input, compute R = P + zP = (1 + z)P.
βR(P,P ) = βR(
1
1 + z
R,
1
1 + z
R) =
1
(1 + z)2
R =
1
1 + z
P.
This solves 1-SDH for c = 1. 
Lemma 4. CDH and I are polynomially reducible to each other.
P r o o f. (a) CDH is polynomially reducible to I: Given oracle I, which
constructs (1/z)P from P and zP , first construct z2P . We do it as follows:
Compute (1/z)P , (1+z)P , (1/(1+z))P , (1/z)P − (1/(1+z))P = (1/(z+z2))P ,
(z + z2)P, z2P .
To get CDH (given R, uR, vR, find uvR) we use the above squarer
oracle twice as follows: Compute (u+ v)R, and (u− v)R. Call the squarer twice
to compute (u+v)2R, and (u−v)2R. Their difference is 4uvR. 4−1 exists modulo
the known odd group order hence we can find uvR.
(b) I is polynomially reducible to CDH: To solve I, where we are given
P and zP and want to find (1/z)P , let R = zP , and let u = v = 1/z. This
is an unknown value, but we know uR = vR = (1/z)zP = P . Call oracle
βR(uR, vR) = uvR = (1/z)(1/z)zP = (1/z)P . 
6. Open problems.
1. Is there an average case reduction from SBB to GSBB?
2. Can there be an average case reduction from SBB to GSBB (subject only
to the restriction that the two problems are over the same elliptic curve
group, and using the same generator) that would not imply that problem
M is easy?
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